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RECENT DECISIONS
Twenty-four years after the International News deci-
sion, it still seems, in general, that the noted case, though
it found no unfairness present, took the best approach to
the problem of unfair competition by laying emphasis on
"unfairness". The element of "palming off" should be un-
essential, and the courts should be free to provide relief
where it is equitable to do so, unfettered by the notion
that the element of deception of the public is a prerequisite
to recovery. This policy, of course, does not necessarily
preclude a court from adhereing to Justice Brandeis' posi-
tion where appropriate.
JOHN T. JOSEPH
Recent Decisions
Administrative Law - Requirement Of Notice And
Hearing On Telephone Co. Tariffs. Bird v. Chesapeake and
Potomac Tel. Co., 185 A. 2d 917 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1962).
Appellant sued the telephone company for the allegedly
negligent omission of his name and number from the alpha-
betical telephone directory. The Municipal Court restricted
appellant's recovery to $39 under a limitation of liability,
tariff provision, previously approved by the Public Utilities
Commission without notice and hearing. Appellant con-
tended that the Commission's approval of the limiting pro-
vision was invalid because such limitation operated as a
rate increase, which could be granted only after notice and
a hearing. The D.C. Municipal Court of Appeals, basing
its decision on statutory construction of the word "rate",
held that the statutory requirements binding on the Com-
mission as to regulation of the basic rate, viz. notice and
hearing, were inapplicable to regulations having only a
minor and indirect effect on the company's financial oper-
ation.
The Maryland Public Service Commission Law, unlike
the D.C. statute, broadly defines the word "rate", 7 MD.
CODE (1957) Art. 78, § 2(q). Although the definition of the
word "rate" in the Maryland Public Service Commission
Law appears broad enough to include this type of tariff
provision, the statutory procedure for establishing or chang-
ing rates, 7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 78, §§ 68, 69, 70, does not
require notice and public hearing before such a rate change
can become effective. For a general reference see: Oppen-
heimer, Administrative Law in Maryland, 2 Md. L. Rev.
185, 203 (1938).
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Constitutional Law - Commitment Of Drug Addict To
Rehabilitation Center Does Not Constitute Cruel And
Unusual Punishment. In Re De La 0, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489,
378 P. 2d 793 (1963). Petitioner was charged with viola-
tion of a Califortiia statute making unlawful use of and
addiction to narcotics a misdemeanor, Cal. Health and
Safety Code § 11721; a statute which, two weeks subsequent
thereto, was ruled unconstitutional by the United States
Supreme Court in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962). Thereafter the municipal court pursuant to Cal.
Penal Code § 6450 suspended the criminal proceedings and
certified petitioner to the superior court for a hearing to
determine the extent of his addiction. The court adjudged
petitioner an addict and committed him to the custody of
the Director of Corrections to be confined in California's
Rehabilitation Center for a maximum of five years in com-
pliance with § 6450. The present action was brought in the
Supreme Court of California on an order to show cause
issued upon application for writ of habeas corpus, the peti-
tioner contending that the statute, pursuant to which he
was committed, was unconstitutional within the meaning
of Robinson v. California. In the Robinson case, the United
States Supreme Court found that § 11721, as construed by
the California courts, made the status or condition of being
a narcotic addict a crime. The Supreme Court of the United
States held that such condition could be considered only as
an illness, not a crime, and the criminal penalty of a mini-
mum of 90 days imprisonment imposed by § 11721 con-
stituted a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. The Court, however, recognized the
power of a state to regulate narcotic drug traffic within its
borders and to establish a civil procedure providing for a
compulsory treatment of narcotic addicts which might re-
quire periods of involuntary confinement and penal sanc-
tions for non-compliance with treatment procedure. In the
instant case, the California Supreme Court, after analyzing
the statute, § 6450, held: that despite its location in the
Penal Code and its inter-relationship with the Welfare and
Institutions Code, the inherent civil aspects of the program
established under this statute outweighed the external in-
dicia of criminality, and, therefore, that petitioner's com-
mitment and confinement did not constitute cruel and un-
usual punishment within the meaning of the Robinson case.
In Maryland, if a person charged with a criminal offense
is found upon pre-sentence investigation by the probation
staff and court psychiatrist to be addicted to narcotics, he
may be committed to a state mental hospital for treatment
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and observation. 2 MD. CODE (1957-Cum. Supp. 1962), Art.
16, § 49. The commitment is under the direct control of the
court and must be made by a judge of the Supreme Bench
of Baltimore City or a Circuit Court judge of a county. For
additional reference see: ABA-AMA JOINT COMMITTEE ON
NARCOTIC DRUGS, DRUG ADDICTION: CRIIME OR DISEASE?
(1961); ELDRIDGE, NARCOTICS AND THE LAw (1st ed. 1962);
MODEL PENAL CODE (Prop. Off. Draft 1962) § 6.13; SCHUR,
NARCOTIC ADDICTION IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA (1962).
Evidence - Illegally Obtained Evidence Inadmissible
In A Civil Suit After Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Peters v. Rosetti, 31 L.W. 1121, 31 L.W. 2396 (N.Y. City
Civ. Ct. 1963). Plaintiff was a guest in an apartment which
was forcibly entered by police officers without a warrant.
The officers searched the apartment, seized numbers policy
slips from the occupants, and $1982 in cash from the plain-
tiff. Subsequently, plaintiff pleaded guilty to a criminal
felony charge - the possession of policy slips. After police
refusal to return the money, plaintiff sued in replevin.
Under New York replevin procedure, plaintiff has the
burden of proving lawful title to property used for a law-
ful purpose before he can demand a return of property
seized by the police. The New York City Civil Court con-
cluded that if the testimony of the police officer who had
seized the money in the unlawful raid was inadmissible,
the money could not be connected with the illegal policy
slips and plaintiff had carried the above mentioned bur-
den of proof. Ruling that the exclusionary rule of Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) was applicable to this evi-
dence, tarnished by an illegal search and seizure, the Court
held that the money should be returned to the plaintiff.
Prior to Mapp, state courts, both with and without the
exclusionary rule in criminal cases, consistently admitted
illegally obtained evidence in civil suits, United States v.
One 1953 Oldsmobile Sedan, 132 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ark.
1955), and Jackson v. State, 251 Ala. 226, 36 So. 2d 306
(1948). Whether or not Mapp requires that the exclusion-
ary rule be applied in state civil cases, as this court did,
remains an open question. See: Lebel v. Swincicki, 354
Mich. 427, 93 N.W. 2d 281 (1958); Note, Evidence Obtained
By Unreasonable Search Excluded From Civil Suit, 8 Utah
L. Rev. 84 (1962); Note, Evidence Illegally Obtained By
Private Persons Held Admissible In State Civil Action, 63
Col. L. R. 168 (1963) and Note, Admissibility of Illegally
Obtained Evidence In A Civil Case, 17 Wash. & Lee L. R.
155 (1960).
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Insurance - Construction Of Life Policy Purchased
From Vending Machine. Steven v. Fidelity and Casualty
Co. of New York, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 377 P. 2d 284 (1962).
The deceased purchased a round-trip airplane ticket, in
which part of the original itinerary called for a connecting
flight from Terre Haute, Indiana to Chicago, Illinois. He
then purchased a standard life insurance policy from a
vending machine and according to its directions mailed it
to the beneficiary, his wife, who is the appellant. The
policy contained over 2,000 words of fine print which de-
ceased had no chance to read before the required mailing
and which attempted to limit coverage by several "incon-
spicuous" clauses. It stated that the coverage was appli-
cable only for travel on "scheduled air carriers" and that
it covered substituted emergency transportation necessi-
tated by an interruption of the scheduled air carrier's ser-
vice if the insured was riding in a land conveyance. De-
ceased's scheduled flight to Chicago was cancelled and the
local agent aided deceased and two others in arranging a
substitute flight by an air taxi service. This flight crashed
and beneficiary brought this action against the insurer.
The Supreme Court of California found that these limit-
ing clauses were ambiguous in that they did not make it
clear that such an arranged air taxi service was not
scheduled, and in that they did not specify whether or
not the coverage for substitutions was limited to land con-
veyances and excluded all else. The Court also found that
under such a standardized contract purchased from a vend-
ing machine a passenger could reasonably have expected
coverage for the whole trip, including reasonable substi-
tuted transportation, and that the insurer should have
plainly and clearly brought to passenger's attention that
insurer did not extend such coverage. Relying on this
construction of the contract, the public policy considera-
tions whereby ambiguities in policies are to be interpreted
against the insurer, and the consideration that limiting
or exclusionary clauses in such standardized contracts are
not enforceable in the absence of plain and clear notifica-
tion to the public, the Court reversed and held for the
appellant beneficiary. See: 25 A.L.R. 2d 1025 (1952); Rosen
v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, 162 F. Supp. 211
(E.D. Pa. 1958); Lachs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New
York, 306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E. 2d 555 (1954) and Fidelity and
Casualty Co. of New York v. Commander, 231 F. 2d 347
(4th Cir. 1956).
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Mortgages - Reasonable Time To Produce Legal Tender
In Cash Sale. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Dallas
v. Sharp, 359 S.W. 2d 902 (Tex. 1962). Mortgaged real
estate was to be hold under a deed of trust providing that
sale was to be made "to the highest bidder for cash."
Plaintiff, who was the purchaser of mortgagor's interest,
made the highest bid at the deed of trust sale. A personal
check was offered by plaintiff's agent and refused. The
agent then requested a few moments to produce legal
tender. The trustee refused and sold to the next highest
and only other bidder, the defendant mortgagee. The trial
court decreed that defendant's deed be cancelled and the
trustee be ordered to execute and deliver to plaintiff a
trustee's deed to the property. The Texas Supreme Court,
after construing a special verdict of the jury to mean that
it found plaintiff would have produced the cash in a rea-
sonable time within the normal business hours of sale,
affirmed the trial court and held that the plaintiff was en-
titled to a reasonable time within which to produce the
legal tender and that refusal of trustee to allow such time
was unreasonable and arbitrary. Three judges dissented,
arguing that sale under a power of sale in a trust deed must
strictly comply with the terms of that power.
In Maryland the rules governing foreclosure of mort-
gages also apply to sales under deeds of trust. See MD.
RULE W77 and also Hubbard, Deeds of Trust and Article
66, Section 24, of the Maryland Code, 13 Md. L. Rev. 114
(1953). Maryland Rule W74(d) (1) states that any sale of
property under such a power of sale "shall be made upon
such terms as to payment as are provided in the mortgage,
or, if no terms as to payment are provided in the mort-
gage, then the sale shall be made upon such terms as are
reasonable under the circumstances." What result this
rule would produce in Maryland in a similar case is unde-
termined. However, 59 C.J.S. 959, Mortgages, § 572 states
that, "sale under a power in a mortgage or deed of trust
must be conducted in strict compliance with the terms of
that power. . . ." For further reference see: 15 M.L.E. 396,
Mortgages, § 236; 37 Am. Jur. 143, Mortgages, § 703;
McConneaughey v. Bogardus, 106 Ill. 321 (1883); and 2
WILTSIE, REAL PROPERTY MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE (5th ed.
1939) § 669, p. 1081.
Process - Non Resident Amenable To Substituted
Service Of Process For Acts Done In Maryland. Baltimore
Lumber Co. v. Marcus, 208 F. Supp. 852 (D. Md. 1962).
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Plaintiff brought an action for breach of contract against
defendant resident of Pennsylvania and others. Service
of process was made by registered mail on the defendant
Marcus in accordance with the provisions of 7 MD. CODE
(1957) Art. 75, § 78. On defendant's motion to dismiss the
action or in the alternative to quash return of service, the
Court found as a fact and concluded as a matter of law
that defendant Marcus incurred a personal liability to
plaintiff for material supplied by plaintiff for a construc-
tion undertaking in Maryland when defendant solicited
the contract in Maryland and represented that he was
"behind the business." The Court, on these facts, held (1)
that the actions of the defendant Marcus met the "mini-
mum contact" requirement for substituted service through
the Secretary of State because the defendant had clearly
done some business or performed some work within the
State of Maryland and, (2) that defendant non-resident
was therefore subject to such substituted service of pro-
cess. In reaching its decision the Court was required to
interpret and apply 7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 75, § 78, which
is applicable, inter alia, to: "Any nonresident, person, firm,
partnership, general or limited, not qualified under the
laws of this state as to doing business herein, . . ." The
Court decided that the statutory provision did not au-
thorize this method of substituted service only to non-
resident persons, firms and partnerships which are required
to qualify under some particular state law to do business
herein and who have not so qualified; but also to any non-
resident persons, firms and partnerships, including those
who are not required to qualify but who have done busi-
ness in the state. The Court characterized Art. 75, § 78
as a "catch-all" for any type of nonresident who met the
"minimum contact" requirement but who had not ap-
pointed, actually or constructively, an agent upon whom
process could be served, whether or not the nonresident
was required to appoint such an agent by some specific
statute. For further reference see: Maternity Trousseau
Inc. v. Maternity Mart of Baltimore, 196 F. Supp. 456 (D.
Md. 1961); Reiblich, Jurisdiction of Maryland Courts Over
Foreign Corporations Under the Act of 1937, 3 Md. L. Rev.
35, 70 (1938) and Stimson, Omnibus Statutes Designed to
Secure Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Defendants, 48
A.B.A.J. 725, 728 (1962).
Search And Seizure - Prior Determination Of Ob-
scenity By Qualified Person Must Precede Seizure Of Books.
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United States v. Peisner, 311 F. 2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962). FBI
agents in Maryland, after almost two years of surveillance,
believed defendant was transporting obscene books in in-
terstate commerce, although they at no time saw the books,
or knew what books were being transported. On the day
of the alleged offense, defendant was observed loading his
car with packages and heading north from Washington,
D.C. On entering New Jersey, defendant's car was stopped
by a New Jersey Turnpike policeman, and after several
books were found in the back seat and their pages briefly
scanned, defendant was arrested for possession of obscene
literature. No search warrant had been issued and it ap-
peared from the record that the search, seizure, and arrest
had been made, at least in substantial part, because of the
information furnished by the FBI, which information per-
tained solely to possession of books and not to the nature
of them. Convicted of violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1465 (1955),
defendant appealed from a denial of his motion to suppress
the seized evidence, contending that in light of the pro-
hibitions of the First and Fourth Amendments there is a
more stringent standard of probable cause for the search
of books, and that to validate the search and seizure there
must have been a prior judicial determination of the
obscenity of the books. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit, reversing the conviction, held
that probable cause for believing books are being trans-
ported is not sufficient for search and seizure; in addition
there must be probable cause for belief that those books
are obscene. The court was not prepared to state that prior
judicial determination of obscenity is required to consti-
tute probable cause for search and seizure, but it did hold
that as a minimum requirement it was essential that some
qualified individual, aware of the proper test of obscenity
as set out in Roth v. United St'ares, 354 U.S. 476 (1957),
should have made a determination prior to the search and
seizure.
The court relied heavily on Marcus v. Search Warrant,
367 U.S. 717 (1961), in which a warrant was issued for
seizure of specific books, and during the confiscation officers
also seized books not specified in the warrant, but which
appeared on examination by the officers to be obscene. The
Supreme Court held that these search and seizure pro-
cedures lacked the safeguards for non-obscene matter pro-
vided by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In a recent New Jersey case, State v. Parisi, 76 N.J.
Super. 115, 183 A. 2d 801 (1962), the court held that under
the state obscenity statute a prior judicial determination
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of obscenity was absolutely essential for establishing prob-
able cause for a valid search and seizure of allegedly
obscene books. For further reference see Note, Constitu-
tional Law - Search and Seizure - Procedures For
Seizure Of Obscene Publications, 26 Mo. L. R. 501 (1961).
Taxation - National Bank Liable To State For Failure
To Collect Use Tax. Bank of America National Trust and
Saving Association v. State Board of Equalization, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 348 (Dist. Ct. App., 1st Dist., Cal. 1962). Plaintiff, a
national bank, brought an action to recover use taxes paid
under protest. The bank, as one of its services, made avail-
able specially printed personalized checks. Order blanks
were given by the bank to its depositors and subsequently
forwarded by the bank to DeLuxe Check Printers, a Minne-
sota corporation, not qualified to do business in California.
The printed checks in turn were mailed directly to the
depositor and $1.45 was deducted from the depositor's
account by the bank, the selling price of the checks includ-
ing a five cent bank handling charge. The California Dis-
trict Court of Appeals, in affirming application of the use
tax to the sale of checkbooks, held that the bank was a
"retailer," "engaged in the business of making sales" as
defined in Cal. Revenue and Taxation Code, § 6015(b).
The Court further held, (1) that, as a retailer, the bank
could be made an agent of the state, charged with the
collection of the use tax, without impairing its function
as an instrumentality of the Federal Government and, (2)
that by failure to collect the tax, the bank became indebted
for an equal amount to the state.
The Maryland use tax, although differing from the
California tax in terminology, is quite similar in applica-
tion and legislative intent. Compare, e.g., Comptroller v.
Glenn L. Martin Co., 216 Md. 235, 140 A. 2d 288 (1958)
with In Re Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 45 F. Supp.
77 (S.D. Cal. 1942). Under the Maryland Retail Sales Tax
Act, 7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 81, § 324(F) (2), "any produc-
tion, fabrication or printing of tangible personal property
on special order for a consideration," is considered to be a
taxable "retail sale." Rule 34 of the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Comptroller of Maryland is even more
specific, stating, in part, that banks, when ordering im-
printed checks for their customers, should be regarded as
purchasing the checks for resale and should collect the tax
from the persons to whom the checks are resold, 1 CCH
State Tax. Rep. Md. 60-019(E) (1961). For further refer-
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ence see National Bank of Detroit v. Dept. of Revenue, 340
Mich. 573, 66 N.W. 2d 237 (1954), appeal dismissed 349
U.S. 934 (1955); noted 53 Mich. L. Rev. 988 (1955) and
Farmers and Mechanics-Citizens National Bank of Fred-
erick v. Comptroller, Daily Record, Oct. 22, 1960 (Cir. Ct.
of Fred. County, Md., 1960).
Torts - Defamation By Radio And Television Broadcast
Is Actionable Per Se - "Defamacast." American Broad-
casting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson, 106 Ga. App.
230, 126 S.E. 2d 873 (1962). Plaintiff was one of two
Federal prison guards who in 1934 accompanied Alphonse
Capone from Atlanta Federal Prison to Alcatraz Federal
Prison. In a fictionalized television presentation of that
event, one of these guards was represented as having ac-
cepted a bribe from the prisoner Capone. The Georgia
Court of Appeals in overruling defendant's special de-
murrers in a defamation suit, held inter alia, that the old
categories of libel and slander are not directly applicable
to defamation by broadcasters and that such defamation
should be actionable per se under a new category,
"defamacast."
In the United States, some courts have considered radio
and television defamation as libel, others as slander, and
still others consider it as libel if read from a script and
slander if not. PROSSER, TORTS (2d ed. 1955), § 93; 1 HARPER
& JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS (1956), § 5.18 and Annot.,
5 A.L.R. 2d 957 (1949). In England, defamation by broad-
cast has been made libel by statute. Defamation Act, 1952,
15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 66, §§ 1, 9, 16(1). The Ameri-
can Law Institute view is that broadcasting with script
is libel, but the same words broadcast without a script
can be libel or slander depending on the area of dissemi-
nation, the deliberate and premeditated character of the
publication, and the persistence of the defamatory con-
duct. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 568, comment (f).
The Georgia Court of Appeals, by establishing the new
"defamacast" category, can now disregard many of these
distinctions between libel and slander as regards radio
and television presentations. The need for such a "new
tort" theory has also been recognized in Summit Hotel Co.
v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A. 2d 302
(1939) and in the dissenting opinion in Kelly v. Hoffman,
137 N.J.L. 695, 61 A. 2d 143 (Ct. ERR. & APP. N.J. 1948).
See Vold, The Basis for Liability for Defamation by Radio,
19 Minn. L. R. 611 (1935); 14 M.L.E. 207, Libel and Slander,
§ 1 et seq.
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